4. A Further Objection and its Solution

30. But on the contrary [to n.29]:

Then he would carry back an advantage from his fall, since he rises more worthy of reward in acceptation.

31. Besides, the response given [n.29] seems to include things repugnant to each other; because if he is worthy of a greater glory when he rises than when he fell, and he fell from a great grace whereby he was worthy of a great glory, then he does not rise in a little grace, because that single merit, which by rising he adds on, would not add as much glory as was the glory taken away by the deficiency of second grace (or its being lesser with respect to first grace);     therefore etc     .It was argued in n,29 that someone who rises from sin can rise with greater merits and for a greater glory than when he fell, even though the grace he receives in rising is less than the grace he first had when he fell. The objection is that if he had great grace before, the merit he gains in rising will not add as much glory as was taken away by the loss of the first grace. So if he rises to greater glory, the difference cannot be in the merits he gains but in the grace he is given, and that grace cannot be little but must be more than he had before, if he rises now to a greater glory than before. ⁶⁹

32. To the first [n.30] I say that he does not obtain an advantage but a great disadvantage, not only because he sinned, but because (as to the issue at hand) the whole time he remained in sin is lost to him, and in that time he could have multiplied merits, had he then remained in grace.

33. To the second [n.31] I say that if one removes what in glory corresponds to merits (and let it be called b) from what in it corresponds to grace (and let it be called a), perhaps a does exceed b; and when he rises, because all his prior merits live in God’s acceptation, the right and dignity for the whole of b returns; but the right for a does not return to him, if the second grace is less than the first; therefore the merits live again, but the prior grace does not live again.

34. And this is sufficiently consonant with justice, because the prior grace was a gift of God only, but the merits were in some way the works of man; and therefore are they always preserved for him in divine acceptation; but the grace is not so preserved for him that he should, because he had it, be always equally ordered to a reward on account of it - but only if he now has it.

35. This way, by holding that the essential degree of glory corresponds to merit [n.34], is consonant with Scripture, which in many places asserts this sentence of divine justice, that it “renders to each man according to his works” [Psalm 61.12, Romans 2.6]; but nowhere in Scripture does one get that he renders to each according to what he has. And it is consonant with the observance of divine Law, because it is useful to do continually, as far as possible, meritorious works according to the Law, though the works are weak to such degree that through them grace is not at once increased; because a determinate degree of glory corresponds to individuals in God’s acceptation.That is (as n.36 makes immediately clear) the works, though weak, are accepted by God for glory if not immediately for increase of grace. ⁷⁰

36. Nor is it as expedient to preserve grace as it is to do a weak work that grace is not increased by, because although he who thus weakly acts not have greater grace through his work than he who sleeps (in whom grace is preserved without such work), yet he does not labor in vain, nor does he exceed in nothing him who slept; rather by the fact that he worked he is now worthy of some eternal good which the former is not worthy of.